As for more "contemporary" stuff. You brought up the notion of people becoming things, as in V., and I was thinking about that while Cherrycoke, snowed in with M. and D., the German girls, the French chef, etc., is thinking about the nature of the Eucharist. He is revisiting questions of whether "the Body and Blood of Christ are consubstantiate with, or transubstantiated from, the Bread and Wine of the Eucharist." (385) I think this dilemma is pretty well-tied-up-with that (maybe original?) Pynchon problematic of animate-becoming-inanimate. Does living flesh become "non-living" foodstuffs? (If so, which is implicit in the vocabulary of the liturgy, the Christian mass would hinge on this very transition from "alive" to "not alive" -- and back to "alive" again? although I guess that last transition isn't directly reflected in the ceremony of the mass...) Cherrycoke posits at last that "the outward Forms are given to bread and wine as an act of God's Mercy, for otherwise we should be repell'd by the sight of real human Flesh and Blood." (385-6)
This hypothesis of his seems to resonate with and expand upon the ways Pynchon has already identified that people live with the fact of violence done to other people. It is given forms that seem more humane to mask a "terrible reality" -- something of GR's old "paper death"?? The violence is still there, but in a digestible form (or at least a form we've learned to digest without much trouble). It's really interesting that (a) Cherrycoke settles on an answer that is actually heretical, and that (b) this heresy is pushed one step further to imagine that even the Body and Blood might only be digestible metaphors for an "Ultimate Carnality." Seems bleaker now than the passage had initially let on...
With that in mind (or without it: probably doesn't matter), I want to get to that long epigraph from Cherrycoke's book that begins Ch. 35 (pg 349). I think it's a fairly famous passage in the novel; most I've read about the book has at least made mention of it, no doubt because of the way it seems to be, almost too simply, a clear definition of "History" in Pynchon-terms. "History is not Chronology," but "nor is it Remembrance....[It] can as little pretend to the Veracity of the one, as claim the Power of the other." That's just straight-shooting: history can't be the factual record that Uncle Ives insists upon, but neither is it memory, because "[that] belongs to the People." So if History belongs to someone other than "the People," it must belong to the Historian. Later, in the argument with Ives, Cherrycoke asserts that "It may be the Historian's duty to seek the Truth, yet must he do ev'rything he can, not to tell it."
On the one hand, I think it's pretty easy to say, "This is Pynchon's artistic goal! This is how we should read Pynchon!" and I don't think that's entirely wrong either. I think in a lot of ways, he did intend this passage to be a clear explication of some previously vague distinctions between terms that Pynchon had secretly reappropriated decades ago. There is definitely an analogy between why "Aesop was oblig'd to tell Fables," and why Pynchon is "oblig'd" to write historical fiction of this variety. (350) The truth is in the fiction.
On the other hand, which is not really in contradiction to the first hand, I think there is also something here that deals with the voice Pynchon uses to narrate his novels, as opposed to his authorial imperative: the technique vs. the motivation. In that same epigraph, Cherrycoke* says that "Practitioners [of History, i.e., Pynchon] must soon learn the arts of the quidnunc, spy, and Taproom Wit." Now I won't pretend I didn't have to look up "quidnunc", but apparently, a quidnunc is a gossip. Spy is obvious. "Taproom Wit" to me, seems the most complex component; in my mind, its a sort of blend of stand-up comedy and lewd drunken humor. All of these things, when considered retrospectively, are pretty directly at play in Pynchon's prose. Gossip, espionage, and inappropriate comedy. The syntax of the second half of the epigraph was a little more difficult, but I essentially interpreted it to say that holding on to this "tangle of Lines" that together make up "History" (as opposed to a "Chain of single Links") is our best chance at avoiding the collapse into the abyss. If we held onto a chain of single links (read: "facts") the debunking of one so-called "fact" would be too traumatic and destructive to bear.
Realizing now also that I forgot a semi-major point about Pynchon being a "subjunctive" historian ("what may yet have happened") that I guess I'll relegate to the next post.
Till then.
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